Hearing

OPINION OF THE COURT.— The Court is asked to interpret Part 4, Section 8(3) of the Prosecution Act 2025, which provides:

“A person serving as legal representation on a case may only discuss the case with their client, or any witnesses who are privy to the case.”
The question before the Court is whether a party who elects to represent themselves is, by that fact alone, considered to be “serving as legal representation” for the purposes of this provision.

We hold that they are not.

The Prosecution Act distinguishes between a person acting as legal representation and a party who is self-representing. Elsewhere within Part 4, the Act separately refers to circumstances where an Attorney fails to appear “or they are self representing,” demonstrating that these are treated as distinct situations under the Act.

This distinction is further supported by Part 8, Section 11. That Section describes legal representation as a relationship in which an individual requests representation from a certified attorney, and provides that attorney-client privilege applies to an agreed representation between the attorney and the client. The statutory structure therefore contemplates a representative acting on behalf of another person, rather than a party becoming their own legal representative simply by declining outside representation.

Part 4, Section 8 also regulates specific persons involved in ongoing proceedings, including members of the Department of Justice, members of the Supreme Court, legal representatives, and jurors. It does not generally prohibit every plaintiff or defendant from discussing their own case. This distinction is particularly significant because a breach of Section 8 may result in prosecution for Perversion of Justice, a Class A crime.

WHEREFORE.— For the purposes of Part 4, Section 8(3) of the Prosecution Act 2025, “a person serving as legal representation” means a person acting as the legal representative of another party. A plaintiff or defendant who is self-representing does not fall within Section 8(3) solely by virtue of representing themselves.

For the avoidance of doubt, this interpretation does not reopen, revive, alter, or otherwise affect any case withdrawn prior to the issuance of this opinion, including DC-141 and NA-143. It solely defines the meaning of P4, S8(3) for future application. This opinion was written by Associate Justice Brokyy_ with Chief Justice Dreckly, Deputy Chief Justice Kelpti, Senior Associate Justice Faaaaiiitthh and Associate Justice Pawtistic in agreement.

Associate Justice .Martin, in agreement with Senior Associate Justice Inconclusive-, concurring with the ruling, adding by way of additional reasoning — A preliminary point to raise would be that within Part 4, Section 8 of the Prosecution Act 2025, which states "Discussion of Cases by Officials". "Officials" it says, and the section covers (1) Members of the Department of Justice, (2) Members of the Supreme Court, (3) A person serving as legal representation and (4) A person serving as a juror. These roles have in common that they are either ex-officio, by virtue of their rank and membership within either the Department of Justice or the Supreme Court, or by appointment, by virtue of being assigned or accepting to be assigned to be someone's legal representation or being appointed as a juror (or a replacement justice). A plaintiff or defendant are not "officials", as they hold these characteristics based on whether they are suing or being sued. Furthermore, Part 4, Section 8(1) of the Prosecution Act 2025 makes a clear distinction between plaintiffs and defendants and their legal representation, as it states "the Plaintiff (or their legal representative)" and "the Defendant (or their legal representative)". Self-representing plaintiffs or self-representing defendants would be contacted in their role as the plaintiff or defendant, that is as themselves, not as their own legal representation.

Additionally, Attorney–Client privilege, as established under Part 8, Section 11(2) of the Prosecution Act 2025, explicitly defines it as covering "every agreed representation made between the attorney and the client". One cannot enter into an agreement with oneself.